To argue that the arbitrator did not have the power to decide whether the school district had only reason to end the bereavement without allowing it to collect benefits accrued on the basis of the ISSU is to ignore section 1133 of the school law. This section cannot be more explicit and the only reasonable interpretation leads to the conclusion that the arbitration award has drawn its essence from the collective agreement. We must then check whether the arbitrator, who found only one reason (by noticing the immorality), had the power to change the sentence of the district. The association argues that, because the first edition for an arbitration proceeding included the sub-question “What will be the remedy,” and because the second issue concerns sick leave and medical sabbaticals, the arbitrator did not act outside the limits of his authority, although the absence of a particular language in the penalty authorization agreement. While this argument blushes at first, it is not without difficulty. In particular, we believe that the decision of our Supreme Court in the SUITE results in a contrary result. The term “just cause” is not defined anywhere in the agreement, and the dismissal or dismissal of a teacher, if not included in the term “discipline,” is also not dealt with elsewhere. Moreover, the agreement does not specifically address the question of whether an arbitrator can amend a sentence, nor does it include it by referring to the 1949 (school code) act.  While the mechanisms of the appeal procedure are defined in the agreement, they no longer define the powers of the arbitrator and are therefore not illuminating on the issues dealt with here.
Finally, the collective agreement does not deal with the content of the sick leave or medical sabbaticals. The association argues, referring to various cases, that the transfers of sentence have been maintained in the past. In the Wilkes-Barre Area Educational Association v. Wilkes-Barre Area School District, 113 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 492, 538 A.2d 81 (1988), the court found that an arbitrator`s decision that teachers cannot be worth several hours because they did not participate in parent-teacher conferences drew their basis from the collective agreement. But Wilkes-Barre was not a substitute for the penalty. The arbitrator simply decided that the school district`s previous practices prohibited the borough from securing a teacher`s salary. In united Transportation Union, Local 1594 v.
Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority, 28 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 323, 368 A.2d 834 (1977), a bus driver was dismissed for substandard work. We felt that the arbitrators could reinstate him, but refuse to pay it back. In this case, there was also no mention of a confusion of the sentence, but even if the refusal of reimbursement was considered such a substitution, the case is not where the worker`s conduct, if established by the arbitrator as a fact, is contrary to an important public policy expressly established by Parliament and is therefore not controlled. City of Philadelphia v. Fraternal Order of Police, 125 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 625, 558 A.2d 163 (1989), was awarded under the Act of June 24, 1968, P.L. 237, 43 P.N. 217.1 to 217.27 (Law 111). This Law requires the Court to use another level of control and it is not uncommon for a result to be confirmed in a case of Law 111 that would not be authorized by Law 195.